Broad social and cultural histories of such communities emerged, occupying "private" spheres beyond the ken of military and state leaders. Concomitantly, history came to be less univocal, linear, and descriptive, although the chronological narrative remained the standard form. Highly rationalized and social scientific accounts of subnational groups and supranational organizations and environments became increasingly common. These analyses highlighted abstract social processes such as economic development or human rights that were comparable across "societies" and at the root of widespread interdependencies.9
These broad changes are known to academic historians and are thought to have affected the practice and teaching of history worldwide. But little systematic effort has been made to document their effects on curricula. Indeed, empirical investigations of long-term curricular changes, historical or otherwise, are surprisingly rare. Furthermore, the aforementioned changes in "history" present a problem for educational theorists, who tend not to analyze or even consider the causes of widespread, long-term curricular transformations. Within most of the literature on the intended curricula, the focus is on individual classrooms, schools, or countries, and curricular change is attributed to local or national redistributions of power, which is conceived as the control over economic or political resources.10 From these perspectives, considered further below, one might expect (1) much cross-national variation as to what and who constitute history, as there is much crossnational variation in the magnitude and quality of the distributions of power,'1 and (2) economically and politically dominant transnational actors to be prominent in the history curricula of many countries.
This article emphasizes an alternative theoretical perspective. Rather than distributions of power, we hypothesize that models of "society" shape the intended curricula, especially with regard to what gets taught as history. And rather than local or national definitions of "society," we emphasize global models, institutionalized in world cultural understandings and international organizations. World models are known to be consequential both 12 and more narrowly on intended curricula.'3 Here we look specifically at the ways in which world models of "society" underlie changes in university history curricula.14 With these general issues in mind, we examined empirically the history curricula offered by universities between 1895 and 1994, using data from a total of 335 course catalogs, representing a wide range of countries around the world (see appendix table Al).
The Argument: Transformations in "Societf'
The perceived nature of societal units and their relations to the wider environment changed greatly over the twentieth century, catalyzing a revision of history curricula. Throughout this period, the dominant units seen to constitute "societies" and the "world" were nation-states and the interstate system. These entities held monopoly claims to sovereignty over society's internal affairs and in principle over its external transactions. And nation-states reciprocally supported one another in a worldwide network of recognition and association. 15 At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the interstate system was seen as more hierarchical than it is now. Much of the world was conceived to be peripheral or dependent-without civilization or sovereignty. The "great civilizations" of the East were visible at the time, but they were not organized as nation-states, and thus stood peripheral to the modern world system. More prominent were the Western nation-states, seen in modern terms as at least modestly rationalized societies. entities were less sharply conceived as functioning social systems than they are now. They were still seen to be animated by their linkages to a general Western civilization-born in Greece and Rome, partially sustained by Byzantium, and restored to brilliance with the European Renaissance (and with the accumulation of military and economic powers). At the apex of this world were the dominant colonial powers, laying the most direct claim to the ancient, high, Western heritage.16 England and France, especially, bore the mantle of civilization, and they held pride of place on the world stage. Imperial dominance generated and sustained this Eurocentric vision of the order of human societies.
With the procession of the twentieth century, however, the nature and forms of social groupings diffused and differentiated.17 The interstate system expanded after World War I, and dramatically after World War II, coming to comprehend the whole globe. This growth changed and de-Westernized "society," unraveling the distinctions between Western nation-states and others. By the start of the current decade, the world had come to be seen as made up of more standardized social forms: unorganized peripheries, dependent territories, and external civilizations had essentially disappeared, replaced by a whole world of sovereign nation-states.18 The new nation-states, and also the old ones, were organized around universalistic rational-legal principles rather than a distinctive high cultural heritage. This broad transformation of societal entities and the world catalyzed a transformation of depicted history. In many ways, it decreased the focus on and tamed the nation-state as a model and locus of history and, especially, lowered the centrality of the metropolitan nation-states. We expect several specific changes.
The Demise of Civilization as a Grand Narrative
With the reenvisioning of "society" from an evolving nation to a functioning social system, the dramatic historical focus on civilizational roots declined. In particular, the special sacred thread linking the West to bygone eras receded from prominence. Nation-states in the nineteenth century were legitimated by links to "civilization," and thus they depended on the remembrance of past glories and ancient traditions.21 Just as the nobleman decked his halls with ancestral portraits, so the civilized nation-state displayed its place in an unbroken line of descent. With the rise of more rationalized forms of society, by contrast, legitimacy came to reside in the functional operations of the empirical present.22 If the nation was required to dramatize its links to the past, the social system was required to display more functional forms of history, along with plans for future progress and justice.
Catalogs from the University of Benin illustrate the point. According to these catalogs, the number of history courses devoted to the study of Greece More generally, we hypothesize that nation-states themselves receded slightly from history, as they were increasingly embedded in more differentiated social systems. Throughout the twentieth century, the nation-state remained the paramount embodiment of "society." It served as the core con- 
There even arose notions of a global village and a planetary holiday (Earth Day) .30
The case of Thailand is paradigmatic in this regard. In 1955, only 1 percent of its university's history curriculum covered world history. By 1976, the percentage had multiplied to 6 percent. By 1993, it had further grown to 12 percent. Expressions of social reality, and histories of that reality, became commonplace world-wide.31 HYPOTHESIS 6. The proportion of the history curriculum devoted to world, international, and supranational histories should have increased between 1895 and 1994.
Just as social groupings wider than the nation-state arose with the elaboration of rationalized social systems, so did narrower ones. The differentiating, egalitarian logic of the new models of "society," with their declining focus on state leaders, enabled subnational groups formerly excluded from the polity to gain public standing and official citizenship.32 The late recognition of these groups, retrospectively coded as discrimination, engendered distinctive histories that charted group entries into public life.33
For example, between 1959 and 1992 at the University of Toronto, an increasing proportion of the history curriculum focused on Canada's racial and ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, women, and workers. Worldwide, it grew more common to consider the particular status and history of subnational groups.
HYPOTHESIS 7. The proportion of the history curriculum chronicling subnational groups should have increased between 1895 and 1994.
In all of its new forms, "society" became decreasingly embedded within culture and tradition over the course of the twentieth century. The new myths emphasized progress and justice, not sacred destiny, and were seen to be transcendent over the unique properties of "societies." Thus, stories of primordial origins were displaced by analyses of present functions. With this process of rationalization, we hypothesize that historical depictions of the conceived social system became more contemporary, analytical, and scientific.34 The recognition of "society" as an interdependent social system expanded. Thus, 33 Dumont (n. 17 above); Frank, Schofer, and Torres (n. 14 above). 34 Anderson (n. 3 above); van Dijk (n. 4 above).
HYPOTHESIS 8. The proportion of the history curriculum devoted to more social scientific and contemporary depictions of "society" should have increased between 1895 and 1994. Overall, we expect that worldwide changes in institutionalized models of "society" and the "world" spurred worldwide changes in university history curricula.
The causal mechanisms linking reconceptions of "society" to revisions in history curricula were manifold. At the root of these mechanisms was a cultural change, which reoriented the perceived reality by altering definitions of the conceived social system. But the culture did not operate alone. More mundanely involved were organizations and actors who conveyed the new perceptions of reality to universities; such actors often functioned as the direct catalysts of curricular change. There were many different types of actors involved-intellectuals, including historians; higher education and state officials; social movement and status-group advocates; and a range of transnational experts in higher education, public elementary and secondary schools, and the subject of history.35 We assume that these actors were embedded in highly scripted cultural frameworks that were derived from world models of knowledge, progress, and justice, and we thus emphasize the models themselves.36
For empirical evidence, we now turn to worldwide data on the university history curriculum, 1895-1994. Our basic aim is to ascertain whether there are observable trends consistent with our argument, and thereby to illustrate our perspective. Byway of contrast throughout the discussion of results, we recall the implications of the alternative arguments introduced earlier:
(1) that there should be much cross-national variation in history curricula and (2) that history curricula worldwide should focus on the dominant global powers. For each independent nation-state, we sought one course catalog per 10-year period from 1895 to 1994, preferably from a single university. When catalogs from two or more universities per nation-state were available, we preferred those from the most central university, with centrality assessed by prestige and/or official association with the state. When multiple catalogs per period were available, we selected the catalog closest to the midpoint year. And when a complete set of catalogs was not available from any single university, we cobbled together catalogs from different universities, again preferring the most central.
Even with these flexibilities, the data set has relatively few complete cases for individual countries (i.e., countries with data in every 10-year period from 1895 or year of independence). This is true because World Wars I and II slowed the flow of international materials, because catalogs became expensive to circulate (though some are now available on microfiche), and because catalog collections grew burdensome to warehouse. Some countries enter the data set only once, often coinciding with the enthusiasm of independence and the establishment of national universities. To compensate for missing data, we shifted to 25-year periods in the analysis, averaging the available data for each country per period.
The missing cases may be more idiosyncratic than the ones we collected: countries that do not participate in the international circulation of course catalogs may also be less likely to participate in the international circulation of constitutive cultural materials. Furthermore, European countries are better represented in the early years than other countries, as universities in much of the world only arose in the post-World War II period. Nevertheless, the breadth of our data set far exceeds any that has been collected to date. When we began, we doubted even that the course catalog itself, as a tool or technology, existed worldwide. We also did not expect to find extensive collections of such catalogs, dating back even to the 1860s, and we were surprised at the comparability of the catalogs, in terms of content and organization.37 In other words, we had been misled by the prevailing local- With catalogs in hand, we located the history curricula. Universities following the English or American models typically designated distinct departments of history. Universities following the French model were sometimes less direct, embedding history in a larger organizational unit such as a Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. Even in these cases, however, the history courses were easy to locate. They were nearly always grouped together and taught by a few designated professors.
In coding, we relied on information contained in course titles and, when available, accompanying course descriptions (available in about half the catalogs). We focused on five domains of curricular content, which are based on earlier studies of history curricula and curricula more generally.39 These domains are self-representation, area, time period, subnational groups, and special subjects.
Self-representation screens for five entities that define the boundaries of the "society" within which the university exists (many courses do not score on this dimension at all): the host nation-state (e.g., the history of the United States), a supranational region (e.g., the history of North America), a present or former colonial power (e.g., the history of England), a present or former colony (e.g., the history of the Philippines), and a supranational cultural group (e.g., the history of the West). We also note when a course focused on any specific nation-state outside the home country. The area domain demarcates 17 territories on which a course may be focused: Classical Greece and Rome, England, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, other Western European designations, the United States, other North American designations, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, the Far East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania, and the world. Time period distinguishes five eras in Western history, which for practical reasons we use generally: prehistory, ending with the invention of writing; ancient history, ending with the decline of the Roman Empire; medieval history, ending after the Reformation; modern history, ending with the French Revolution; and contemporary history, proceeding to the present. The fourth domain attends six subnational groups on which a history course might focus: ethnic, indigenous, gender, class, religious, and other groups (such as children). Finally, the fifth domain specifies 10 special subjects: international relations, diplomatic history, historiography, art and music history, colonial history, war and military history, religious history, economic history, political history, and a residual category. Certainly, one could identify other in38Altbach; Phyllis Riddle, "The University and Political Authority: Historical Trends and Contemporary Possibilities," Research in Sociology of Education and Socialization 11 (1996): 43-62. 39 Frank, Schofer, and Torres; Mao (n. 14 above); Meyer, Kamens, and Benavot (n. 13 above); Wong (n. 13 above).
teresting content domains in history curricula, but we believe these are the ones most relevant to our arguments. Most courses score in several domains simultaneously. For example, a course entitled "Women in Medieval France," taught at the University of Paris, scores in the host nation-state category of self-representation, the France category of area, the medieval category of time, and the gender category of subnational groups. Sometimes, a course scores in more than one category per domain. For example in area, a "History of Latin America and the Caribbean" course receives half a score in Latin America and half in the Caribbean. Sometimes a course scores in only one domain. Generic historiography, for example, scores only as a special subject. The resulting numbers are aggregated and divided by the total number of history courses. Thus, if there are seven Middle East history courses out of 70 total history courses, the area category Middle East receives a .10. Such numbers are then averaged across the university cases to yield the world-level results we present below.
To insure that our findings did not result from a changing case base (which in substance means more non-European cases over time), rather than the substantive processes emphasized, we compared the results presented below with those yielded by a constant-case data set. These results appear in appendix table A2. In order to retain a reasonable case base, we reduced the number of time periods from four to two: 1895-1944 and 1945-94. Nearly across the board, the constant-case results are consistent with those presented, although the changes are typically less pronounced. The nature of our data limit our study to the intended curriculum, as represented by course titles and abstracts. Information derived from course catalogs cannot reveal either what changed in the discipline at large or what was actually implemented in college classrooms.40 Surely, both the overall discipline, encompassing the paradigmatic vision and professional knowledge production practices of historians, and the implemented curriculum exhibit more cross-national variability than does the intended curriculum. We believe our century-long, cross-national perspective goes some distance to compensate for this limitation.
The Results
First, we expected a decreasing focus on Western civilization and metropolitan centers. Because the primordial nation gave way to the differentiated social system, we hypothesized that less attention would be paid to the sacred thread of history-to the origin points of Western civilization in the ancient Indeed, the average proportion of university history curricula focused on the ancient period declined steeply in this 100-year period, falling from 18 percent in the years 1895-1919 to 10 percent in 1970-94. Likewise, the proportion devoted to Classical Greece and Rome fell sharply, declining from 10 percent to 4 percent between 1895 and 1994.41 Both findings suggest that the stories of ancient Greece and Rome, which encode the charismatic genesis of democracy and Western civilization, receded from worldwide view over the twentieth century, with the waning of models of "society" as primordial imagined community.
Not only did the origin points of Western civilization lose prominence during this period but so did the histories of Western Europe generally (see table 1 ). The average proportion of the curriculum focused on Western Europe fell by more than half over the twentieth century, from 36 percent to 14 percent. This loss came partly as a result of Western Europe's declining political and economic hegemony. But the other findings in table 1 suggest that Western Europe also lost historical centrality as the region's claims to "civilization" ceased to distinguish it as a special locus of "society" and the national state.
Altogether, the results in table 1 suggest-albeit with limited data-the demise of civilization as the grand narrative of university history curricula. As traditional models of national "society" declined, Western charisma waned in the history curriculum, both as a locus of "society" and a focus of the "world."
By contrast, we note that the data summarized in table 1 provide little support for the argument that differences in local or national power structures should generate cross-national variation in history. We find roughly 41 To reduce bias in the proportions shown in tables 1-3, we excluded universities in specified regions and universities from the colonial power of the specified region. Both exaggerate a region's importance. We excluded countries not colonized in the modern period from the first row of table 2, which shows the proportion of the history curriculum that is focused on a country's colonial power. the same pattern of changes in all kinds of nation-states. For example, the average proportion of university history curricula focused on ancient history declined in both never-colonized and colonized countries and in both developed and lesser-developed countries, although the colonized and lesserdeveloped countries paid consistently less heed to the ancients than the others. Indeed, the data show much convergence in the course titles and abstracts of history curricula across countries. 42 The results, however, also lend at least some support to the argument that dominant world actors should be prominent in the university history curricula of many countries. In particular, the decline in historical focus on Western Europe may be seen to result from the decline in Western European power. But the equally sharp decline of classical histories is less explicable from this perspective: Greece and Rome specifically exercised little military or economic dominance either at the beginning or the end of the twentieth century, but they nevertheless fell dramatically in curricular prominence.
We believe that a shift away from civilizational models of "society" underlies change in university history curricula. The results in table 1, while by no means conclusive, show the twentieth-century unmooring of "history" from Western civilization and the metropolitan nation-states and are thus consistent with our view.
Second, we expected to observe a decline in histories focused on unique nation-states, in particular those distinguished by connections to Western civilization. As "society" expanded beyond nations to social systems, we anticipated that states' roles in history curricula would shrink. Data illustrating this trend appear in table 2.
Some of the fall in nation-state histories derives from a decline of the colonial powers. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the former colonies devoted a very high proportion of their history curricula to their colonial powers: 33 percent on average (see table 2). In contrast, by the end of the century, with the colonial system almost entirely dismantled, this same proportion had fallen more than 10-fold, to 3 percent. The colonizing nation-states lost their special prominence in history curricula and the world as their colonial holdings won freedom.43
But the decreasing focus on nation-state histories was, perhaps, not only related to the end of the colonial system. A more general process is evident in table 2; in this process, the forms of legitimate "society" differentiated 42 Over the twentieth century, the average proportion of university history curricula focused on the ancient period declined from .25 to .11 among the never-colonized countries and from .09 to .07 among the colonized. The same proportion fell from .21 to .10 among developed countries and from .11 to .09 among the lesser-developed countries. 43 To further investigate the point, we focused on the former colonies of England and France. We set a strict constant-case standard, allowing into the data set only countries scoring values by 1934 (results not shown). The declines are steep. England and France faded rapidly from the history curricula of their former colonies over the twentieth century, falling more than fivefold in both cases. and dispersed, embedding more universally conceived nation-states in more multifaceted social systems. One aspect of this wider process is seen by comparing the average proportion of university curricula devoted to the history of England with the average proportion devoted to the United States (table 2) . England stood at the apex of the nineteenth-century world, wielding considerable military and economic power and serving as a model of civilized national society. Its importance was duly noted: worldwide, the average proportion of university history curricula that was devoted to England was 14 percent in the 1895-1919 period. Very rapidly, however, England lost its leading role. By 1970-94, only 2 percent of the average history curriculum focused on England.
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This decline may not be surprising, since England lost hegemony from the late nineteenth century onward. What is much more remarkable is the fact that the United States, which gained immense economic and political importance over the period, failed to take England's place, or even to gain any historical centrality worldwide. The United States began the centurywith 3 percent of the average university history curriculum and then actually lost ground, ending the century with 2 percent.44
The sharp contrast in the two countries' historical centralities suggests that, unlike England, the model of "society" represented by the United States did not derive from, nor was it stored in, an illustrious past or unique cultural heritage. The United States was conceived to embody a rationalized model of "progress," not a sacred evolution. Its "secret" was stored in universally available principles such as economic "development," and it was codified in new social sciences such as economics, psychology, and sociology, rather than history.45 Thus, the United States never became a worldwide focus of university history curricula (although its hegemony may have influenced the rise of the rationalizing social science discourse that legitimated subnational and supranational entities in history curricula).
Besides the colonial powers and hegemons, nation-states in general receded as main vessels of history over the twentieth century. The average proportion of the history curriculum organized in terms of the host nation-state (i.e., the university's home country) declined slightly between 1895 and 1994, following an initial jump after the nationalistic World War I (table 2). More striking is the drop in histories of specific nation-states outside the home country, which declined from 39 percent to 24 percent over the twentieth century. With the embedding of nations in social systems, origin stories appear to have become more universalistic. Universities that once offered histories of the French Revolution, for example, were increasingly likely to replace them with general histories of revolutions, and, likewise, universities offering histories of the colonial period in Mexico became susceptible to broadening them into general histories of colonialism.
While admittedly limited, the data in table 2 suggest an overall decline in histories of particular nation-states. As the hegemons lost the distinguishing marks of civilization, and as rationalization and globalization rendered all nation-states as more equal, similar, and porous, the leading roles in history became less monopolized by unique nation-states, at least in the university curriculum.
Once again, these trends appear in all kinds of countries-statist and liberal, colonized and never-colonized, and lesser-developed and developed-undermining the cross-national variation hypothesis. Also once again, only some data provide support for the argument that economically and politically dominant transnational actors should be prominent in the history curricula worldwide. The precipitous drop in histories of England and the colonial powers are entirely consistent with this perspective: both lost global economic and military strength over the century, and both declined in history curricula. On the other hand, the United States gained immense economic and military centrality over the period, and it too declined as a proportion of the average history curriculum. Thus, we advocate a different kind of argument. While the nation-state remained a main repository of the conceived social system, a central and highly legitimate form of imagined community, it was increasingly joined throughout the twentieth century by other societal forms, subnational and supranational. Thus, the nation-state's relative share of university history curricula declined. Third, we predicted a general rise in historical attention to aspects of rationalized social systems not captured by state structures or national polities. As "society" spilled beyond the unified nation, new social groupings and the processes interconnecting them grew prominent in history. Bigger entities such as the whole world, systemwide operations such as capitalism, and subnational groups such as women penetrated and overlaid the boundaries of the nation-state. Data illustrating this view appear in table 3.
In line with our expectations, we see a rise in historical attention to a wider world (see table 3). At the beginning of the twentieth century, with vestiges of a system stratified by "civilization" still in place, a mere 5 percent of the average history curriculum focused on world, international, and supranational histories. In 100 years, that percentage rose fourfold. By the last period, more than 20 percent of the average history curriculum depicted the conceived social system in global terms. A world level of reality, unified and whole, grew increasingly real.
The structure of this world was more horizontal than its nineteenthcentury predecessor. Its rise entailed the decentralization and, especially, the de-Westernization of the environment embedding nation-states.46 We ex- In addition to such broader regional and global depictions, we also expected to see more local embodiments of "society." In particular, we thought declining state-centrism and the rise of mass politics might increase focus on mobilized citizen groups, especially those that once faced barriers to public participation. We anticipated expansion in the historical coverage of subnational groups.
The data showjust such an increase (see table 3 ). With the procession of the twentieth century, the total coverage of subnational groups in university history curricula rose a substantial 11-fold, from .3 percent to 3.3 percent. Racial and ethnic minorities; indigenous peoples; women, class, and religious groups-all became vessels of "society" and thus experienced an enhanced role in university history (although the overall proportions remained quite small).
We also expected history to broaden beyond stories of political heritage. Because the functioning rationalized social system displaced the civilized nation, we expected traditional political histories to be joined by more abstract, present-day, and scientific origin stories. One indicator of this is the rise of economic histories, which show expansion in the two most recent time periods (see table 3). After World War II, abstract models of economic development became increasingly widespread and began to be incorporated into history.47 Likewise, histories of the contemporary period rose about onethird during the twentieth century. Of course, the period itself, which begins with the French Revolution and proceeds to the present, expanded. But the wider pattern of changes in tables 1-3 suggests that university history curricula increasingly depicted "societies" as abstract, functioning social systems, operating in the empirical present, rather than unique evolutionary outcomes and vessels of the traditional past.48 In this particular sense, history became less "historical" over the twentieth century.
Together, the results in table 3, while based on limited data, suggest increasing attention to a rationalized social system that is functionally interactive from local to global levels. Wider regional and global forms of "so- 47 Chabbott. 48 Mao shows a similar change in depictions of Chinese history.
Comparative Education Review 47 ciety" arose in university history curricula, as did more differentiated local ones. All these social forms, including the nation-state itself, were increasingly conceived as highly rationalized and abstract systems, functioning in the present. The new instances of "society," however unequal in political and economic resources, were nevertheless conceived to be the same species of entity and to have the same rights and responsibilities as other "societies." Historical depictions changed accordingly.
The cross-national variation hypothesis again receives only weak support. The trends reported in table 3 appear in all kinds of countries. Nevertheless, even as they have promoted convergence, the common trends have not completely erased differences between different groups of countries. For example, the trend toward increasing coverage of the world as a whole appears for all our cases in aggregate and for the liberal and statist polities separately. Nevertheless, throughout the period, the liberal polities maintained a relatively more local historical orientation, and the statist polities a more global one.49 Likewise, the rise in contemporary history appears across different types of nation-states. Nevertheless, the formerly colonized countries began the century more focused on the pragmatics of the present than others, and they stayed so even as history in all kinds of countries became more contemporary.
The argument that economically and politically dominant transnational actors should be prominent in the history curricula of all kinds of countries fares somewhat better. On the one hand, the world as a whole and the nonWestern regions gained military and economic prominence over the twentieth century, and they rose in history accordingly. Many subnational groups may also be said to have gained power, and they too grew more prominent in history. On the other hand, this argument has little to say about the recent expansion of economic history or the longer-term rise of contemporary history.
Thus, we emphasize a broader perspective, addressing the whole pattern of changes. Overall, the results in tables 1-3-though only illustrative-are consistent with our theoretical framework and hypotheses. Legitimate models of "society" have shifted at the world level, from depicting primordial nations to depicting rationalized social systems. We hypothesize that this has driven curricular transformation. The worldwide changes we observe in the constitution of university history are consistent with this view.
Conclusion
Our main effort has been to explain a set of interrelated changes in university history curricula: a decreasing focus on Western civilization and the 49 The average proportion of university history curricula focused on world history increased from .04 to .18 among liberal countries and from .10 to .26 among statist countries over the twentieth century. metropolitan centers, a lowering of the centrality of nation-states, and an increased attention to sub-and supranational aspects of the rationalized social system. The changes involve more than simple curricular differentiation, which could arise from intrauniversity forces such as expansion and niche competition.50 Rather, the changes form a distinct pattern, which we believe follows from a transformation of world models of "society." As nations were embedded in functioning and interconnected social systems, what counted as history in university curricula fundamentally changed, and it did so in an orderly fashion.
Data from university history curricula throughout the world illustrate the argument. The results suggest the importance of the world-level cultural environment in constituting official school knowledge. While the dominant theories of curricular change emphasize the powers of local elites and the needs of national societies, we find evidence of the importance of global institutional patterns. Worldwide changes in models of "society" appear to have spurred worldwide changes in the constitution of history.
While global institutional effects appear clearly in the history curriculum, such effects might be even more pronounced in other fields of knowledge such as the natural sciences, where fewer notions of local specificity prevail. That is, while the histories of France and Algeria are supposed to be different in the legitimating imageries of the discipline, the physical sciences of the two countries are supposed to be the same. Thus, world-level changes in conceptions of "nature" might have even more striking worldwide effects on university curricula than have world-level changes in conceptions of "society."
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In the present case, we see that when "society" was defined largely in the national terms of imagined community, the history curriculum depicted the mainly political evolution of singular nation-states from civilizational origins. When "society" came to be defined in terms of a rationalized and differentiated social system, history shifted in focus. Local, national, and global societal forms arose, in an elaborate web of contemporary interdependencies.
Our results suggest the utility of cross-national and longitudinal studies of curricular change, which until recently have been rare. At present, the content of the curriculum and its societal determinants are still only weakly conceptualized, primarily from the perspective of a left-leaning functionalism, which sees curricula in terms of elite domination. But actual curricular content is rarely systematically investigated in support of this view. Ours is an attempt to develop a more general perspective on curricular changes that is rooted in empirical investigation. Comparative Education Review
